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ABSTRACT 
Some organizations use software applications to manage their customers’ personal, medical, or financial 
information. In the United States, those software applications are obligated to preserve users’ privacy 
and to comply with the United States federal privacy laws and regulations. To formally guarantee 
compliance with those regulations, it is essential to extract and model the privacy rules from the text of 
the law using a formal framework. In this work we propose a goal-oriented framework for modeling and 
extracting the privacy requirements from regulatory text using natural language processing techniques. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Software applications are developed to help companies and organizations to process and 
manage data that support their daily operations. However, this data might contain sensitive 
clients’ information that should be protected to ensure clients’ privacy. Besides losing clients’ 
trust, neglecting to ensure the clients’ data privacy may also be unlawful and inflict serious legal 
and financial consequences. Lately, different laws and regulations [1]–[3] related to data privacy 
have been enacted specially in vital sectors such as health care, finance, and accounting. Those 
regulations dictate how clients’ data should be disclosed and transmitted within the organization 
and also with external partners. The privacy rules in laws and regulations presented a 
challenge for software engineers who design and implement software applications that 
process private client data. The difficulty is linked to the complexity and length of the 
letter of the law and the how to guarantee that the software application is maintaining 
the clients’ data privacy in compliance with the law 
Some healthcare organization are trying to perform their own interpretation of the law privacy 
rules by creating custom systems. However, the problems with such approach is that the margin 
of error while interpreting the letter of the law is high specially with separate efforts carried out 
by individual companies. According to a survey carried out to check the Healthcare Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements interpretation created for medical and 
healthcare related applications, none of the frameworks were well developed to capture the 
relationships specified in the law [4]. To solve this problem, a standard framework is required 
that will analyze the regulatory text and provide a method to extract the relevant component that 
can be used during software roles engineering and development. The extracted components will 
include all the possible arrangements of roles, purposes, permissions, temporal factors, and any 
carried out obligations. 
In this work we propose a framework to analyzes, extracts, and models the privacy requirements 
from HIPAA regulatory text. The framework goal is to translate the law privacy rules text into 
more manageable components in the form of entities, roles, purposes, and obligations. Those 
components together can be used as building blocks to create formal privacy policies. The 
process concentrate on two main components; entities and their roles, and data access context. 
To get the first part, the framework will parse the privacy sections of the regulatory text to mine 
all the subjects, and then categorize those subjects into roles based on their characterization in 
the law. To acquire the access context, the process will extract all the purposes, temporal clauses 
and any carried out obligations and classify them based on their permissibility. 
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the complexity of HIPAA and 
other regulatory text modeling. In section 3, we cover access control models and the elements 
that should be extracted based on the selected access control mode. Whereas section 4 describes 
the proposed framework for extracting and modeling the access requires context from the 
regulatory text. Section 5 provides a literature survey of laws and regulations modeling and 
current proposed approaches. Finally, we discuss our future work and conclude in section 6. 
2. LAWS’ PRIVACY RULES AND MODELING COMPLEXITY 
In the U.S., numerous federal laws and regulations were legislated to guarantee individuals’ 
right to be able to access and port their private information stored and managed by service 
providers while protecting that information from unauthorized access. For example, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 [2] is designed to protect individuals’ financial 
information from being breached without proper authorization. The Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 [1] is another example, section 164 of HIPAA is 
intended explicitly to protect patients’ healthcare information and medical records from 
unauthorized disclosure [5]. According to HIPAA, any healthcare related information that can 
identify an individual and can be stored or transmitted via any media format is defined as 
Protected Health Information (PHI). HIPAA privacy rules control the storage, transmission, and 
disclosure of all Protected Health Information. Usually the PHI is collected and maintained by 
healthcare insurance plan, healthcare provider, healthcare clearinghouse or any other similar 
organization identified by HIPAA as Covered Entity. Comparable privacy rules can also be 
found in other federal regulations as well. 
2.1. Modeling Complexity 
The U.S. federal regulations documents are written in a complex format and technical language 
known as legalese. Legalese or legal English uses different vocabulary and syntax than that used 
in ordinary English. The complex format and legal terminologies makes legal documents hard 
to read and interpret. 
A part from the document language, the structured format makes the text prone to 
misinterpretations and other ambiguities like cross references and exceptions. The document is 
usually structured into parts (e.g. Part 164 of HIPAA). Each part is then divided into subparts, 
which is additionally divided into sections (e.g. Section §164.528). Some sections are also 
divided into subparagraphs with multiple points in the same sentence. This create some 
inconsistency as some privacy rules are spanning multiple points, subparagraphs, paragraphs, 
or event sections. For example, the subparagraph §164.528(a)(2)(ii) contains three points (A), 
(B), and (C) in the same sentence: “the covered entity must:(A)...;(B)...; and (C)...”, where each 
one of these points defines a different obligation that should be carried out by the covered 
entity. 
Exceptions and Cross-references to other sections add more complexity to the modeling process 
as they require an additional processing efforts. References usually entail priority between 
paragraphs and add more clarity to the privacy requirements. However, sometimes references 
might introduce ambiguities due to the possibility of nested and multilevel referencing in the 
form of cross-references. Cross-references occur when a section or a paragraph in the law is 
referencing another section/paragraph that has a reference to another rule. For example, the 
subparagraph §164.528 (a)(2)(i) describes individuals’ suspension of rights obligation. This 
right is also addressed in a different paragraph as highlighted by the phrase “as provided in 
§164.512(d)” at the end of the paragraph establishing a reference. Nevertheless, in the 
subsequent paragraph §164.528(a)(2)(ii), the phrase “pursuant to paragraph (i)” is a reference to 
the preceding paragraph. Hence, to model the right indicated in §164.528(a)(2)(ii), we need to 
refer to §164.512(d) creating an indirect relation between the two paragraphs. On the other 
hand, exceptions are rules that contradict or negate other rules by changing the permissibility 
right or by adding more conditions or obligation. So, if the first rule grants a right to access a 
PHI, the exception would either add more conditions to clarify that right or grant permission 
and vice versa. For instance, §164.512(c)(1) in HIPAA grants the right to disclose a PHI if the 
information is about adult victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence, however, 
§164.512(c)(1)(ii) presents an exception to this right by adding victims agreement as a condition 
for such a disclosure. 
 
3. ACCESS CONTEXT 
Access context represents the elements that can be used as an input to the to an access control 
system. To create a privacy preserving access control system that enforces the privacy rules 
from the regulatory text, we need to extract the access context. In this section we show those 
components and the importance of formalizing them.  
 
3.1. Context-Based Access Control 
In information security, Access Control is implemented as a mean to decide whether any 
specific authenticated system user has the proper permission to access a certain data object, or 
carry out a particular type of operation (e.g. read, write, delete …etc.) on that object [6]. 
Most access control models are described using three terms: subject, object, and operation. 
Subject refers to any authenticated user, it could be a system, a person, or a process. Whereas 
object is defined as the private data that the access control system is protecting. Finally, 
operation is any action that can be taken by the subject on the object. Figure 1 shows the three 
terms of simple access control model. The permissibility to carry out those operations is ruled 
by a collection of access rights expressed in the format: 
ALLOW [Subject] 
TO PERFORM [Operation] ON [Object] 
 
Figure 1. Simple Access Control Model 
 
Access control models evolved over time to solve particular issues the traditional model was not 
able to handle correctly. For instance, Role-Based Access Control model (RBAC) [7] extended 
the traditional simple access control model described above to add the subject role. In RBAC 
users’ role is used in the access right rules instead of users’ identities. RBAC model was 
introduced to solve the any inconsistency faced by dynamic systems where users’ role is prone 
to change, and hence, there permission and access rights should change as well to adapt the new 
roles. Figure 2 below illustrate RBAC components and the relation with the system users. 
RBAC access rights rules are formally formatted and expressed as: 
ALLOW [Role] 
TO PERFORM [Operation] ON [Object] 
 
Figure 2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Model 
 
In order to facilitate a more fine-grained details that will capture the privacy rules and 
requirements of HIPAA regulatory text, a new model was introduced to capture the access 
context. The Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) model is an extension to RBAC with more 
details to allow higher flexibility and regulatory compliance. CBAC depends on the user roles, 
request purpose, and object type to determine the permissibility of the access request. CBAC 
also provides a mechanism to log any carried out obligations as a result of granting access to the 
object. Recently, many formats were suggested to represent CBAC, in this work we propose a 
modified version Powers et al [6] version of the Privacy Access Control model as shown in 
figure 3. CBAC access rules can be formally expressed in the format below: 
 
ALLOW [Active Role] 
TO PERFORM [Operation]  
ON [Data Type] 
RELATED TO [Data Owner Type] 
FOR [Purpose]  
PROVIDED [Condition] 
CARRY OUT [Obligation] 
 
Figure 3. Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) Model 
3.2. CBAC Components 
To better understand what elements and components the framework should extract from 
regulatory text, we need to align the extraction and modeling process with CBAC access rules. 
In this section we will describe each component and how to formally model that component in 
order to extract it. 
Requester Active Role: As CBAC is an extension of RBAC, it also uses the requester role 
instead of the requester identity. However, due to the fact that any user can be in multiple roles, 
we use the current active role only. For example, if Alice is a doctor and a patient at the same 
time, when accessing her own medical file she will be treated as a patient only as that is the 
current active role of Alice. 
 
Operation: any set of actions that can be applied to data objects, similar to the 
traditional model. The set contains read, write, and delete action in addition to any other 
applicable operation provided by the system. 
 
Data Type: Context-Based access rules are not tied directly to a particular data object, 
but rather to the type of data object. The data type can be defined at high-level (e.g. 
treatment related files), or at a much lower-level (e.g. Medical chart files, CT scan 
images …etc.). This introduces the notion of attaching attributes or metadata to the data 
itself. 
 
Data Owner Type: The data owner type element specifies the state and the type of the 
owner of the data object. By capturing this element, we can establish a relation between 
the PHI, its owner, and the requester. For example, if Alice is a doctor requesting access 
to Bob’s medical file, we can check if Alice is role as a doctor is relevant to Bob’s file 
as a patient of Alice. If the relation is established then in this case Bob is the owner of 
the PHI and his type in relation to Alice is a patient. 
 
Purpose: This element represents the reason why the access requester is requesting 
access to the specified data object type. Purposes can also be classified at a high-level or 
low-level depending on the provided request context and the letter of the law. It could 
be healthcare related like treatment or medical consulting, financial for the purpose of 
accounting, or legal like violence and crime investigations. 
 
Conditions: Any pre-defined additional conditions and criteria required to be fulfilled 
before accessing the protected data object or allowing the disclosure. A common 
example of conditions in HIPAA is obtaining the data owner permission and consent 
before sharing their data with any third party. 
 
Obligations: Obligations in access request refer to the action that should be carried out 
by the covered entity, the access requester, or the system itself after permission was 
granted and the data was transmitted. It might include operations like logging for audit 
purposes or notifying the data owner of the disclosure action. 
 
4. THE MODELING PROCESS 
This section presents the proposed framework process and steps used to extract privacy 
requirements from the regulatory text. The process is divided into two activities: firstly is the 
model and analysis activities to model the regulatory text, and secondly the identification and 
extraction activity to extract the privacy requirements context. Each one of the two activities 
contains a number of steps. Figure 4 demonstrates the extraction process with the two activities 
as well as each activity initial inputs and the expected outputs. 
4.1. Model and Analyze HIPAA 
The purpose of this activity is to overcome the difficulties and issues that complicate HIPAA 
modeling as explained in section II.B. Raw HIPAA rules are used as an input to the activity, and 
then the following steps are performed: 
Step 1: Identify scopes and definitions: the first step is to outline the extraction scope. In this 
framework, the emphasis will be on the privacy rules related to preserving patients’ identity and 
PHI disclosure. After analyzing HIPAA regulatory text and excluding all the abstract, non-
technical requirements, we found that the extraction process should only be applied to the 
privacy requirements from the following subsections of HIPAA: §164.502, §164.506, §164.510, 
§164.512, §164.514, and §164.524. 
 
Figure 4. HIPAA privacy requirements extraction process 
Step 2: Identify and resolve rules dependencies, cross-references, and exceptions: the goal of 
this step is to validate the subset of selected rules from step 1 and to add more clarity to HIPAA 
legal text. This goal is attained by replacing self-references, dependencies, and cross-references, 
with the exact description from the referenced rule, or by applying a similar depiction to 
improve the rule readability and interpretation. Alternatively, if the reference is identified as a 
condition it might be replaced with a rule identifier placeholder for further processing in an 
advanced stage of the process. 
The output of the first activity is a reference-free less-ambiguous subset of HIPAA rules that is 
focused only on patients’ privacy. This output will then be used as an input in the following 
activity. 
4.2. Identify and Extract the Context Elements 
The second activity aims to perform the extraction process. Similar to the preceding activity, 
this activity also is divided into multiple steps where the final step is the responsible for the 
context elements extraction. In this activity the regulatory text is parsed using a Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) application to highlight phrases that may establish a possible 
context element. Figure 5 outlines the components of the rule §164.528 (a)(2)(i) of HIPAA as 
an example of the expected results. 
 
Figure 5. An outline of HIPAA rule §164.528 (a)(2)(i) components. 
Step 1: Clearing ambiguities: HIPAA legal text contains domain-specific wording and 
terminologies that will require the assistance of law professional to provide a precise 
interpretation and definition of the text. As some words, terms, and phrases might carry multiple 
meanings causing further ambiguity and a higher chance of misinterpretation. At this step, all 
the ambiguous terms, words, and phrases will be mapped to a set of possible meanings as 
proposed by the work of Otto et al [8]. 
Step 2: Text parsing and elements extraction: a text parser is used to identify any possible 
context element. Rules of generalization and specialization are also applied to specify generic 
roles. 
Table 1.  Subparagraph §164.528 (a)(2)(i) Elements Classification 
Element Element Classification 
R164_528_a_2_i Rule Id 
covered entity Role 
 must  Operator 
temporarily  Temporal factor 
suspend rights to receive an accounting 
of disclosure 
Action 
health oversight agency Role 
law enforcement official Role 
(R164_512_d) OR (R164_512_d) Condition 
 
Step 3: Elements Classification: Numerous approaches were proposed to classify elements [8]–
[12]. Nevertheless, each approach was proposed to solve a particular problem or introduced a 
special notation that might not be applicable for generic access control. For instance, Hohfeld 
classification presented the notion of rights and responsibilities. Hohfeld theory represents the 
relationships between actors and the law based on their responsibilities and rights within the 
legal text context [13]. However, our framework is more concentrated on the concept of 
Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) where the core focus is to identify roles, data type, 
purposes, conditions, temporal factors, and obligations. Hence, a Goal-Driven approach can be 
applied where the goal is to extract the CBAC components. Table 1 shows an example of 
elements classification constructed using a goal-driven approach on the data from §164.528 
(a)(2)(i) of HIPAA. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Recent researches in the area of role extraction and engineering reveals a variety of proposed 
methods for extracting and modeling regulation components for different purposes. One of the 
oldest recognized efforts to classify the contents of regulatory text is attributed to Wesley 
Hohfeld which is known as Hohfeld legal taxonomy published in 1917 in Yale Law Journal 
[13]. Hohfeld taxonomy classifies regulatory text based on the notion of rights and obligations. 
Few recent researches have built their extraction models based on Hohfeld legal taxonomy like 
the work of Siena et al [14] and Islam et al [12]. Other approaches used Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) techniques to spot linguistic patterns to model the law and extract the context 
from the legal text [15]. In addition to the language patterns and Hohfeld taxonomy, other 
researchers used different methods including: analytical modeling based on organizational 
structure as in the work of Crook[9], UML-based [16], [11] method for the extraction of privacy 
requirements from organizations privacy requirements, and scenario-driven methods established 
for predefined set of tasks and scenarios [10]. Jorshari et al. work [17] focused on eliciting the 
security requirements in general without making the approach close enough to be adapted for 
extracting privacy requirements. Darimont et al [17] proposed a Goal-Oriented Requirements 
Engineering (GORE) approach to classify rules and form goals where those goals are then 
refined in an incremental fashion until all related tasks, actors, and uses-cases are discovered 
and extracted. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we proposed a framework to model the privacy requirements from regulatory text 
and to extract the possible context elements in the form roles, purposes, and obligations. The 
framework is designed to overcome the traditional complexities and challenges that face laws 
and regulations modeling. The framework consists of multiple steps starting by closely 
inspecting and analyzing the regulatory text to identify the parts of interest of the law that is 
related to the privacy requirements. Then it clarifies ambiguities from the letter of the law by 
resolving cross-references, dependencies, and handling rules exceptions. Next, a Goal-Driven 
approach is applied to examine the identified targeted rules text to extract all keywords that may 
define a context element. 
In a later phase of this research, the context elements extracted using this framework will be 
used to create privacy policies as well as in the decision engine in an access control model. In 
order to implement such a model, the next phase will also include identifying the decision 
engine logic and the specification language that will be used for privacy policy representation. 
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